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Abstract
Phylogenetic studies have largely contributed to better understand the emergence, spread and evolution of highly
pathogenic avian influenza during epidemics, but sampling of genetic data has never been detailed enough to allow
mapping of the spatiotemporal spread of avian influenza viruses during a single epidemic. Here, we present genetic data of
H7N7 viruses produced from 72% of the poultry farms infected during the 2003 epidemic in the Netherlands. We use
phylogenetic analyses to unravel the pathways of virus transmission between farms and between infected areas. In
addition, we investigated the evolutionary processes shaping viral genetic diversity, and assess how they could have
affected our phylogenetic analyses. Our results show that the H7N7 virus was characterized by a high level of genetic
diversity driven mainly by a high neutral substitution rate, purifying selection and limited positive selection. We also
identified potential reassortment in the three genes that we have tested, but they had only a limited effect on the resolution
of the inter-farm transmission network. Clonal sequencing analyses performed on six farm samples showed that at least one
farm sample presented very complex virus diversity and was probably at the origin of chronological anomalies in the
transmission network. However, most virus sequences could be grouped within clearly defined and chronologically sound
clusters of infection and some likely transmission events between farms located 0.8–13 Km apart were identified. In
addition, three farms were found as most likely source of virus introduction in distantly located new areas. These long
distance transmission events were likely facilitated by human-mediated transport, underlining the need for strict
enforcement of biosafety measures during outbreaks. This study shows that in-depth genetic analysis of virus outbreaks at
multiple scales can provide critical information on virus transmission dynamics and can be used to increase our capacity to
efficiently control epidemics.
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Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses represent a
major concern for public health and global economy, as outbreaks in
the last decades resulted in vast socioeconomic damages and
numerous human infections. Thanks to increasing availability of
avian influenza virus sequence data and the development of new
computational and statistical methods of analysis, phylogenetic
studies have largely contributed to a better understanding of the
emergence, spread and evolution of HPAI epidemics [1–3].
However, sampling of genetic data has never been used or dense
enough to allow detailed studies of a single outbreak [4]. The rapid
evolutionary dynamics of avian influenza viruses suggest that
sufficient genetic diversity may be produced during an outbreak in
poultry to permit the reconstruction of the inter-flock transmission
network, providing important insights for the implementation of
efficient control measures. Notably, such detailed genetic data could
be used in combination with epidemiological data to study the
dynamics of epidemic spread, as has been done for the 2001 food-
and-mouth disease outbreak in the UK [5]. However, much remains
to be learned about the way evolutionary processes, such as natural
selection or reassortment, shape avian influenza virus diversity
during an epidemic and how these processes could affect the
inference of virus transmission dynamics [4]. We also expect that
successful identification of inter-farm transmission pathways depend
on the extent and structure of intra-flock and intra-animal viral
genetic variation, but perhaps most notably on the size of the virus
population bottleneck in the process of inter-farm transmission [4].
The epidemic of HPAI H7N7 in the Netherlands in 2003
represents a unique opportunity to study the epidemiological and
evolutionary processes involved in HPAI transmission dynamics in
detail. This epidemic started in the most poultry-dense area of the
Netherlands (Gelderse valley, Gelderland province) on February
28, 2003. Despite implementation of control measures, the
outbreak spread across the entire Gelderland area as well as in a
contiguous central region with a lower density of poultry farms.
New outbreaks were reported in April in the Limburg province,
another poultry-dense area in the South of the Netherlands, in
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Germany and in Belgium [6]. A total of 255 Dutch farms became
infected in a 9 weeks period, and more than 30 million birds were
culled during the course of the epidemic [6]. The virus was
transmitted to 89 people who were directly involved in handling of
infected poultry [7], including one veterinarian who died after
developing acute respiratory distress syndrome [8]. Detailed data
gathered during the epidemic (e.g. location, date of suspicion and
sampling, type of farm, culling date) have been used to estimate
epidemiological parameters characterizing this epidemic, notably
the spatial range over which the virus spread between farms [9].
However, the transmission route between farms could not be
resolved, leaving critical questions about the mechanisms of virus
transmission and the efficiency of control measures unanswered.
The H7N7 virus was sampled from the majority of the 255
farms infected, but, to date, only little genetic data have been
published from this epidemic [8,10]. In this study, we present virus
sequence data from 72% of the farms infected during the 2003
HPAI H7N7 epidemic in the Netherlands. Phylogenetic analyses
were used to unravel the pathways of virus transmission between
farms and between outbreak areas. In addition, we investigated the
evolutionary processes (substitution rate, selection pressure,
reassortment etc.) that were shaping the H7N7 genetic diversity.
We also examined the within-flock viral sequence variation on
selected farms using clonal sequencing to assess its impact on our
phylogenetic analyses. Finally we discuss the implications of the
obtained results on our knowledge of the evolutionary and
epidemiological dynamics of avian influenza viruses and conse-
quences for disease control.
Results
High levels of genetic diversity in HPAI H7N7
Virus RNA was extracted from homogenized trachea tissue
samples from dead chickens (5 chickens per sample) obtained from
184 of the 255 farms infected during the H7N7 outbreak (72%
coverage of the epidemic, Figure 1). We could not process more
samples due to logistical constraints, but we considered that this
coverage was sufficient to reach the aims of this study. The viral
sequence datasets consist of full-length sequences of the H7-
hemagglutinin (HA), N7-neuraminidase (NA) and basic polymer-
ase 2 (PB2) gene segments; preliminary analysis of five full viral
genomes previously obtained from humans and chickens infected
at early and late stages of the H7N7 outbreak (available in public
databases) showed that these three genes contain the highest level
of genetic diversity among the 8 gene segments (data not shown).
Farms are labelled from F1 to F255, following the order of sample
submission to the laboratory during the outbreak. Samples were
selected for sequencing in order to cover the entire timeline and all
areas of the epidemic (Gelderland, Limburg, central area and
southwest area; Figure 1). Moreover, all farms infected within 7
days before the first report of infection in the Limburg area (April
3, 2003) were analysed in an attempt to find the source of this new
outbreak. Details of location and date of sample collection, and
GISAID accession numbers are listed for each sample in Table S1.
The HA, NA and PB2 sequences of the human fatal case (A/
Netherlands/219/03, [8]) were included in the final dataset.
A total of 74 substitution sites were recovered in HA, defining
71 sequences among which 50 were unique in the dataset. NA was
less polymorphic (59 substitution sites), but a strand of 52 to 74
nucleotides in the NA stalk region was also found deleted in 13
samples from the Limburg area, with a total of 7 different types of
deletions, 3 of which resulted in a frame shift in the NA coding
sequence (Table S1). In total, the complete NA sequence dataset
defined 64 different genotypes (42 singletons). The PB2 sequence
data had the highest number of polymorphic sites (81), defining 64
different genotypes (38 singletons). The combination of the genetic
data from the three genes permitted us to define farm specific
genotypes for 141 out of the 184 farms (76%). The HA, NA and
PB2 sequence datasets were found to be free of homologous
recombination using Recombination Detection Program version 2
(RDP2) [11].
Rapid evolutionary rate and early origin of HPAI H7N7
Rates of nucleotide substitution and time of most recent
common ancestor (TMRCA) of the HPAI H7N7 viruses were
estimated separately for the three gene datasets using a Bayesian
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (BMCMC) method [12] as
implemented in BEAST [13], using sampling dates to calibrate
the molecular clock (Table S1). Bayes Factors (BF) [14] were used
to select among strict and relaxed clock models of evolution [15],
and among demographic models of population growth. The
relaxed uncorrelated exponential clock model associated with an
exponential growth model fitted better the data (Table S2). The
analyses showed that the mean substitution rate was very high for
both HA and NA datasets (1.1861022 and 1.0261022 substitu-
tions per site per year (substitutions/site/year), respectively;
Table 1), whereas the estimated rate for the PB2 dataset was
twice lower (0.5461022 substitutions/site/year). These estimates
were associated with large 95% highest posterior density intervals
(HPD; Table 1). TMRCA estimations showed that the origin of
the HPAI H7N7 virus dated back to mid-January 2003 according
to the HA dataset, and as far back as late December and late
October 2002 for the NA and PB2 datasets, respectively (Table 1).
Again, estimations from the NA and PB2 datasets were affected by
large HPD intervals. Similar estimations of substitution rates and
TMRCA were obtained with other sub-optimal clock and
demographic models (Table S2), showing that these results are
robust and not artefacts of the priors used in the Bayesian analyses.
Phylogenetic analyses
Phylogenetic trees of the HPAI H7N7 virus sequences were
reconstructed for the three separate HA, NA and PB2 sequence
Author Summary
Outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
viruses have affected poultry worldwide in the last
decades, resulting in vast socioeconomic damages and
many human infections. It is important to determine the
route of transmission between poultry farms to be able to
implement efficient control measures. Here, we investigate
possible use of sequence data to unravel the route of virus
transmission during an HPAI H7N7 epidemic that took
place in 2003 in the Netherlands. We obtained virus
sequence data from most of the outbreaks during the
epidemic, and found a high level of genetic diversity
driven by a rapid evolutionary rate of HPAI H7N7 virus. The
phylogenetic inference of the inter-farm transmission
network turned out to be difficult due to the presence
of potential reassortant virus strains, multiple mutations at
highly variable sites and within farm virus diversity.
However, most virus samples could be grouped within
clearly defined and chronologically sound clusters of
infection, giving us valuable insights on the diffusion of
the virus during the outbreak. We discuss the implications
of the results obtained for the evolutionary and epidemi-
ological dynamics of avian influenza viruses and disease
control.
Avian Influenza Transmission Dynamics
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Figure 1. Map indicating the locations of farms infected during the 2003 HPAI H7N7 epidemic. Farms are represented by coloured dots,
according to their location and inclusion in a cluster of infection. Black dots in the main map correspond to farm samples not analyzed in this study.
Farm samples represented by coloured squares were used for the within-flock viral genetic analyses. In order to maintain the clarity of the figure, only
the names of the farms mentioned in the main text are shown. All samples are described in details in Table S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1002094.g001
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datasets using Bayesian Inference and Maximum Likelihood
methods (Figure 2A–C, Figure S1A–C). For each gene phylogeny,
multiple sequences could be grouped in clusters that were well
supported statistically. Notably, we could identify 4 clusters of
sequences present in all gene phylogenies (Cluster I–IV,
Figure 2A–C). Three of these clusters regrouped virus samples
from farms infected in the Gelderland area only (Cluster I, II, IV;
in yellow in Figure 2A–C, Table S1), whereas Cluster III included
all samples from the outbreaks in the Central area (blue labelling),
the fatal human case, a sample from the outbreak in the southwest
of the Netherlands (green labelling; F238; Figure 1), the sample
from the most northern outbreak in the Limburg area (red
labelling, F222), and some samples from outbreaks in the
Gelderland area (Figure 2A–C, Table S1).
To assess the inter-farm transmission network, we manually
concatenated the HA, NA and PB2 sequences for all virus
samples, and used this single alignment to construct a Median
Joining phylogenetic network [16] with the program NET-
WORK [17] (Figure 3). The network obtained included all the
most parsimonious trees, thus represented all the plausible
evolutionary pathways linking the farm samples. The network
showed that most virus sequences were grouped in multiple
clusters of infection, including the 4 transmission clusters
identified with the gene-specific phylogenetic analyses (Figure 3).
Sequences within these 4 clusters were separated in average by
3–4 nucleotide differences, whereas 11–20 differences were
observed between clusters. All clusters were connected at the
base of the network by complex reticulations that rendered the
relationships between the clusters hard to determine. In most
cases, one virus sequence identified in multiple farms was at the
origin of an infection cluster. All Limburg samples (apart from
F222) were grouped with Gelderland samples in 2 clusters that
were separated by one single mutation step. These 2 clusters
presented some chronological anomalies (Figure S2). Notably, the
network showed that a virus strain from a farm (F18) that had
been culled a month before the first infection in Limburg was the
closest ancestor to a group of 3 Limburg samples (F192, F204 and
F206; Figure 3, Table S1, Figure S2). Also, according to the
network, 4 virus strains that emerged in Gelderland during the
first 3 weeks of the epidemic (F40, F57, F103 and F107) would
have originated from a virus strain that infected farms in Limburg
after the 5th week of the epidemic.
We identified 15 pairs of farm samples that uniquely shared
identical sequence genotypes, representing likely transmission
events (Table 2, Figure 3). Furthermore, we could identify 13
pairs of samples that were unambiguously connected in the
phylogenetic network. Of these 28 likely inter-farm transmission
events, 25 involved farms located in the same infected area, with a
distance of 0.8–13.6 Km separating them (Table 2). The three
remaining transmission events linked farms separated by much
larger distances (31.3–84.4 Km). The two longest transmission
events corresponded to a transmission from a farm in Gelderland
to the index farm of Limburg (F167–F191, distance: 84.4 Km),
and from a farm in the central area to a farm located is the
southwest of the Netherlands (F236–F238, distance: 65.9 Km;
Table 2, Figure 1).
Selection pressure and molecular characterization in the
HA, NA and PB2 genes
We assessed the selection pressures acting on the three genes by
estimating the ratio of non-synonymous to synonymous nucleotide
substitutions (v = dN/dS) in the different datasets using in
CODEML [18]. When averaged over all sites, all three genes were
predominantly affected by neutral or purifying selection (v ,1),
with PB2 under the strongest negative natural selection (v=0.313;
Table 3). Additionally, likelihood ratio tests revealed that a model
allowing site-specific positive selection pressure (M2a in CODEML)
fitted significantly better than a model of nearly neutral selection
(M1a) for the HA gene (p=0.031; Table 3). A Bayes Empirical
Bayes analysis [19] identified 7 amino acid sites in HA that were
under positive selection (residues 127, 129, 143, 183, 188, 284, 340),
although none of these sites were supported by a significant
posterior probability value (Pr,0.95). We further tried to identify
sites under positive selection in the three genes using the single-
likelihood ancestor counting (SLAC), the random effect likelihood
(REL), and the fixed effect likelihood (FEL) methods [20]. The
SLAC and FEL methods failed to detect positive selection in any of
the three genes. The REL method identified the same 7 amino acid
sites in HA already detected with CODEML as under positive
selection with high posterior probability values (Pr.0.95). In
addition, it detected 7 amino acid sites under positive selection in
the NA dataset (residues 54, 64, 66, 200, 247, 442, 458).
The biological functions of most of these positively selected
residues in the HA and NA molecules are not known. Only the
A143T substitution, which introduces a new potential N-linked
glycosylation site in HA, has previously been identified as being
associated with enhanced virulence in avian hosts [21]. Also, three
positively selected amino acid changes, A143T in HA, and T442A
and P458S in NA, have been also detected in the human fatal case
[8], and have been shown to contribute in enhanced replication
efficiency of the HPAI H7N7 virus in mammalian hosts [10]. The
A143T substitution was found in virus samples from 27 different
farms (Table S1; Figure 3). The T442A and P458S amino acid
changes in NA were present in the majority of the farm samples
(113 farms). Three other amino acid changes identified in the
human fatal case and linked to enhanced replication in
mammalian hosts (E627K in PB2; N308S and A346V in NA
[10]) were not found to be positively selected. The N308S and
A346V in NA were identified in 12 and 36 farm samples,
respectively, as well as in the fatal human case (Table S1; Figure 3).
The E627K in PB2 was not found in chicken samples.
Table 1. Mean nucleotide substitution rates and estimation of TMRCA of the H7N7 epidemic.
BMCMC analysis
Gene Mean substitution rate (61022) Substitution rate HPD (61022) Mean TMRCA HPD TMRCA
HA 1.18 0.79–1.59 15/01/2003 05/12/2002–06/02/2003
NA 1.02 0.65–1.42 25/12/2002 24/10/2002–09/02/2003
PB2 0.54 0.34–0.74 20/10/2002 14/03/2002–13/01/2003
HPD, 95% highest posterior density intervals. Dates are presented in day/month/year.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1002094.t001
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Identification of potential reassortant viruses
We found discrepancies in the phylogenetic relationship
between the four identified transmission clusters in the HA, NA
and PB2 phylogenies. Cluster III was closely related to Cluster IV
in the HA phylogeny, but Cluster III was closely related to Cluster
I in the NA and PB2 phylogenies, and Cluster IV closely related to
Cluster II in the PB2 phylogeny (Figure 2A–C). These discor-
dances suggest that one or more of the transmission clusters
originated from reassortment events. We further investigated the
putative reassortant viruses using bootscan analyses [22] on a
selected dataset (n = 50) of manually concatenated HA-NA-PB2
sequences (Figure 4A–B, Figure S3A–D; see methods). Results of
the bootscan plot showed that Cluster IV was highly similar to
Cluster III in the HA segment, but clustered with Cluster II in the
NA and PB2 segments (Figure 4A). The graph did not produce a
clear-cut breakpoint between the HA and the NA-PB2 segments,
probably because of the poor level of genetic diversity in some
gene regions. We noticed that sequences grouped in the Cluster III
and IV were all characterized by the presence of the A143T amino
acid change in their HA gene (Figure 3, Table S1). Removing the
codon position 143 from the HA dataset resulted in the loss of
support for the clustering of these two groups of sequences in the
phylogenetic trees and the bootscan analysis, thus for the signal of
reassortment (Figure 4B).
In addition, we also observed that the placement of the
sequence of three Gelderland farm samples differed between the
NA phylogeny and the HA and PB2 phylogenies (F45, F76 and
F143; Figure 2A–C). None of the bootscan analyses performed on
these three samples showed a significant signal for recombination
(Figure S3A–C). Similarly to the potential reassortant event
detected for Cluster III and IV, the F45, F76 and F143 sequences
were characterized by the presence of positively selected amino
acid changes in NA (Table S1, Figure 3).
Within flock viral genetic diversity
To estimate the viral genetic diversity within hosts and within
flocks, we performed clonal sequencing targeting an 850 bp
portion of the NA gene (position 57–908) on 6 farm samples (5
chickens per sample). We chose 4 samples (F36, F167, F191 and
F193; Figure 1) positioned at the base of the Limburg-Gelderland
transmission clusters in the network (within groups G8 and G9 in
Figure 4) in order to further assess the origin of the Limburg
outbreak and of the chronological anomalies detected in the
network. We also performed clonal sequencing on the F26 farm
(Figure 1), because two samples taken three days apart (March 6,
and March 9, 2003) were available for this farm, allowing us to
assess changes in viral genetic diversity within a flock. A total of
50–54 clones with NA inserts were sequenced per sample (Table 4,
Figure 5). We performed an additional clonal sequencing analysis
Figure 2. Phylogenetic trees of H7N7 viruses. Time-scaled
phylogenies (dates on the horizontal axis) inferred using Bayesian
MCMC analysis from (A) HA gene; (B) NA gene; (C) PB2 gene. Nodes
supported by $0.7 posterior probability are indicated by a grey dot.
Posterior probability values from the time-scaled BMCMC method, the
MrBayes BMCMC method, and the Maximum Likelihood method
(1,000 ML bootstrap replications) are shown for nodes delimitating
clusters of transmission (tsBMCMC/MrBMCMC/ML; noted Cluster I–IV).
The three samples with discordant phylogenies are indicated by black
square (F45), circle (F76), and triangle (F145). Nodes and branches are
coloured according the geographical origin of the farm samples. Yellow,
Gelderland area; Blue, Central area; Red, Limburg area; Green,
Southwest area. Fully annotated trees are available online in
supplementary figures S2A–C.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1002094.g002
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targeting a 570 bp portion of the HA gene (bases 81–650), but,
due to poor cloning success, only 27 clones with HA inserts could
be obtained from F191 and 12 clones from F193.
For all the 4 samples tested, the most abundant NA and HA
sequence variant represented 17–76% of the obtained sequences
(Table 4, Figure 5). With the exception of the NA variants
obtained for F191, this dominant variant was identical to the
sequence originally obtained and used in the general HA and NA
datasets. The other identified sequence variants were usually
present at low frequency (most of the time only once) and directly
linked to the dominant variant, differing from it by 1–4 nucleotide
substitutions (Figure 5). The clonal diversity of NA in F26 (March
9, 2003) and F193, and of HA in F191 were characterised by the
presence of another sequence variant at relatively high frequency
and at the origin of low-frequency variants. The diversity of NA
sequence variants was extremely high in F191, with all variants but
one containing a stalk deletion (18 different types of deletion were
identified; Table 4; Figure 5).
A total of 168 nucleotide substitutions were recorded, among
which 116 were non-synonymous substitutions (Table 4, Figure 5).
Only 5 out of 168 substitutions had already been identified in the
HA and NA epidemic datasets. Notably, 14 of the 35 NA variants
identified in F191 shared a mutation that had been only found in
farm samples F44, F192, F204 and F206, establishing a link that
was missing between the index farm of Limburg and the three
Limburg farms (F192, F204, F206; red node Figure 5; Figure 3).
Discussion
This study presents one of the most complete viral genetic data
ever obtained on a highly pathogenic avian influenza epidemic,
with coverage of 72% of the poultry farms that were infected
during the 2003 HPAI H7N7 epidemic in the Netherlands.
Results obtained in this study showed that the HA, NA and PB2
gene segments were characterized by a high level of genetic
diversity, allowing the identification of unique virus sequences for
76% of the farm samples analyzed. The estimates of substitution
rates for the HA and NA gene averaged around 161022
substitutions per site per year, which is among the highest
observed for avian influenza viruses [23]. It suggests that enough
Figure 3. Median-joining phylogenetic network of H7N7 viruses. The median-joining network was constructed from the combined HA, NA
and PB2 sequence data. This network includes all the most parsimonious trees linking the sequences. Each unique sequence genotype is represented
by a coloured circle sized relative to its frequency in the dataset. Genotypes are coloured according to the location of the farm sample and its
inclusion in a cluster of infection. Branches in black represent the shortest trees; Additional branching pathways are in grey. Each node is separated
by a specific number of mutations represented by grey dots. Mutations corresponding to specific amino acid changes are indicated. For genotypes
containing a deletion in the NA stalk region, the type of deletion is indicated between brackets beside the name of the isolate (see Table S1 for the
description of deletion types). Names of farm samples involved in likely inter-farm transmission events are in red (see Table 2). (*) positively selected
amino acids linked to adaptation to mammalian hosts. G1: group of samples including F38, F54, F64, F113, F162, F194, F199; G2: F134, F160, F166;
G3: F122, F161, F164, F171, F182; G4: F2, F5, F12, F21, F43, F60, F91; G5: F39, F70, F92, F129; G6: F15, F29, F37; G7: F16, F19, F52; G8: F193, F217,
F223, F231; G9: F36, F68, F167, F191(d1), F205(d5), F207(d2); G10: F203 (d3), F219(d3), F228(d3); G11: F197, F242, F232.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1002094.g003
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viral genetic diversity can be produced within a short period of
time during an HPAI epidemic to allow the use of partial genome
sequences to determine virus transmission dynamics with phylo-
genetic analyses.
Analyses of selection pressure showed that this rapid evolution-
ary rate was mainly driven by a combination of neutral evolution
and purifying selection pressure, with only a limited amount of
site-specific positive selection pressure identified in the HA and
NA genes. TMRCA estimations indicate that the H7N7 virus may
have been introduced in poultry weeks before the first mortality
was reported. This is in agreement with epidemiological models
based on mortality data indicating that approximately two weeks
can elapse after introduction of H7N7 in a flock before change in
mortality is observed [24]. The presence of identical virus
sequences in multiple farms infected at different time periods
(e.g. 6 farms in group G9 spanning a period of more than 5 weeks)
also suggests that the HPAI H7N7 virus was already very stable
and well adapted to poultry when the epidemic started. In
addition, the phylogenetic network showed that many amino acid
changes associated with increased pathogenicity in mammals
appeared already at an early stage during the epidemic. These
results have serious implications for disease control, as they
demonstrate that early and regular monitoring of poultry farms is
necessary to detect and contain avian influenza viruses before they
fully adapt to domestic poultry and become a potential risk for
animal and public health.
We identified several other evolutionary processes that could
have affected the observed viral genetic diversity and might have
led to misleading results in our phylogenetic analyses. Firstly, the
presence of reassortant viruses in our dataset could provoke poor
resolution or even false identification of farm-to-farm transmission
events. Three virus strains (F45, F76 and F143) and one cluster of
closely related viruses (Cluster IV) were identified as potential
reassortants due to their discordant position in the phylogenetic
trees and the network. However, the signal of reassortment in all
sequences was closely associated with signal of positive selection at
specific amino acid residues, so the discordances in the phylogenies
may be due to convergent evolution driven by the adaptive
advantages conferred by these amino acid changes. In all cases, we
prefer to consider these farm samples unsuitable for the study of
the H7N7 inter-farm transmission dynamics until more is known
about these possible reassortment events.
Secondly, an important limitation of our genetic dataset is the
characterisation of only one virus sequence per farm, whereas each
farm (and each individual host within this farm) may contain a
wide variety of closely related virus variants. Our genetic data
could be considered a reliable tool to elucidate the transmission
pathways of the HPAI H7N7 between farms if it can be assumed
that the virus genotype obtained for each farm samples represents
the dominant strain in the farm sample and that this dominant
strain is the one most likely to be transmitted to other farms. These
assumptions were partially supported by clonal sequencing
performed on six farm samples, as the genotype used in our
dataset corresponded to the dominant variant in the clone
population in 5 out of 6 farms. This dominant variant represented
.50% of the clones in 4 samples (Table 4), suggesting that more
cloning effort would most probably not change this result. The
identification of a second sub-dominant strain directly related to
the dominant strain in two samples suggests that dominance can
evolve during the course of infection within a flock. This evolution
of dominance could have caused the genetic differences observed
between farm samples directly connected in the network. These
results have, however, to be considered with caution because of the
small number of farm tested with the cloning technique and of the
very small sampling relative to flock size obtained from each farm
(5 chickens per farm).
Importantly, clonal sequencing of the one farm sample (F191)
also showed that the virus strain originally sequenced was not the
dominant variant of the farm but was a potentially inactive variant
(as it contained a frame shift deletion) present at a low frequency. It
suggests that our genetic dataset was not always composed of the
dominant genotype in the farm samples, potentially affecting the
resolution of the transmission network. The variant with highest
frequency in sample F191 represented 17% of the clones, suggesting
that the absence of a highly dominant strain may have allowed the
sequencing of another variant. This lack of dominance could be due
to the production of a high variety of variants with stalk deletion,
possibly associated with the evolution of a deletion-prone
Table 2. Summary of the most likely transmission events
identified either from pair of farm samples exclusively sharing
the same sequence genotype, or pair of farm samples having
sequence genotypes unambiguously linked in the network
analysis.
Identical genotypes Direct network connections
Sample
pair Location
Distance
(km)
Sample
pair Location
Distance
(km)
F10-F14 G-G 1.1 F59-F121 G-G 13.6
F23-F24 G-G 7.4 F94-F141 G-G 2.9
F25-F42 G-G 8.2 F102-F180 G-G 13.3
F33-F62 G-G 2.1 F103-F107 G-G 11.2
F46-F61 G-G 2 F135-F163 G-G 2.6
F56-F74 G-G 12.4 F152-F179 G-G 1.4
F58-F71 G-G 4.2 F156-F185 G-G 3.3
F99-F130 G-G 1.2 F172-F173 G-G 2.6
F110-F157 G-G 1.9 F202-F216 L-L 2
F111-F132 G-G 3.1 F207-F219 L-L 10.2
F142-F220 C-C 12.3 F224-F234 L-L 3.4
F219-F228 L-L 1.1 F229-F239 L-L 0.8
F36-F68 G-G 5.7 F236-F238 C-S 65.9
F140-F240 G-G 31.3
F167-F191 G-L 84.4
Probable long distance transmission events are in bold. C, Central area; G,
Gelderland; L, Limburg; S, Southwest area.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1002094.t002
Table 3. Values of Log-likelihood (lnL) and dN/dS for HA, NA
and PB2 genes using different selection models in the
CODEML analysis, and LRT tests comparing the two models.
M1a (nearly neutral)
M2a (positive
selection) LRT (M2a-M1a)
Gene lnL dN/dS lnL dN/dS 2Dl p-values
HA 23031.91 0.545 23028.44 0.736 6.94 0.031
NA 22449.32 0.493 22448.46 0.578 1.72 0.423
PB2 23788.85 0.313 23788.85 0.313 0 1.000
We used the degree of freedom of 2 for these LRT tests that is expected to be
too conservative.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1002094.t003
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polymerase in viruses infecting the first farm in the Limburg area
(F191). If it is the case, it would suggest that only the 13 samples
presenting deletions in our dataset may have been wrongly
positioned in the phylogenetic network due to the dominance issue.
Most mutations differentiating the multiple genetic variants
from the dominant variant in the clone populations were
associated with amino acid changes or deletions, suggesting that
the virus population within a flock (and possibly within a single
individual) is composed of strains of variable fitness, with one or
few best-fit strains dominating the population. We cannot rule out
the possibility that the genetic variation observed in our cloning
results is an artefact of RNA manipulation. However, the error
rate of the RT polymerase used (SuperScript III, Invitrogen,
Carlsbad CA, USA) was estimated to be 1/15,000 by the
manufacturer, so it should not have a major influence on an
analysis targeting an 800 bp gene region. Also, the genetic
variation we obtained is similar to what has been observed in
other avian Influenza viruses using a similar approach [25], or in
Hepatitis C Virus using a pyrosequencing approach [26].That
97% of the mutations identified in all clone variants examined
were not found in the complete epidemic dataset suggests
that inter-farm transmission of H7N7 was accompanied by a
population bottleneck. It is important to note that this analysis was
realized with a small number of farm samples, and that the small
number of chicken sampled per farm greatly limited our capacity
to assess properly the viral diversity within flocks. A larger study,
probably involving a pyrosequencing approach [27] and experi-
mental infections in controlled environment, would be necessary
to further tackle the issues of intra- and inter- host viral genetic
diversity and transmission bottlenecks in HPAI.
Results from the network and the clonal sequencing analysis of
F191 showed that some mutations occurred multiple times at
different time periods, leading to chronological anomalies in the
farm-to-farm connections identified in the phylogenetic network.
These anomalies were limited to clusters including Limburg
samples, suggesting that the high viral genetic diversity produced
during the outbreak in Limburg may be at their origin.
Interestingly, reports from officials involved in the control of the
epidemic indicate that F191 may have been infected for over a
week before being reported and sampled. Also this farm housed
.10,000 turkeys, a species shown to play a key role in the
evolution of AI pathogenicity in domestic animals [28,29]. Only
few other turkey farms were infected during the epidemic, and
their culling was swift according to the reports. Therefore, it is
likely that the long infection period of the F191 turkey farm is at
the origin of its high genetic diversity and of many anomalies in
Figure 4. Recombination analysis on concatenated H7N7 virus sequences. (A) Bootscan analysis on the full dataset; (B) Bootscan analysis on
the dataset with the HA codon 143 removed. The Cluster IV virus group was used as query in the analysis, with an 800 bp window size and step size
of 10 bp. A schematic diagram of the concatenated HA, NA and PB2 virus segments is shown on top.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1002094.g004
Table 4. Summary of results obtained from clonal
sequencing.
Sample N H % Dom dS dN deletion
NA
F26 (March 6) 52 18 65.4 2 21 0
F26 (March 9) 54 8 59.3 1 7 0
F36 50 13 76 7 10
F167 56 15 73.2 8 9 1(1)
F191 53 35 17 14 11 52 (18)
F193 53 28 39.6 8 25 8(2)
HA
F191 27 21 18.5 12 26 0
F193 12 7 50 0 7 0
N, number of clones sequenced; H, total number of sequence variants
identified; % Dom, percentage of the clones with the dominant sequence
variant; dS, number of synonymous substitutions; dN, number of non-
synonymous substitutions; deletion, number of variants found with a deletion
(number of different type of deletions).
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1002094.t004
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the phylogenetic network. Additional cloning work may help
resolving all chronological anomalies in the network. An
interesting alternative would be to combine our genetic network
with temporal data (and other epidemiological data) in a
mathematical framework to calculate the likelihood of potential
transmission events, as it has been done for the 2001 food-and-
mouth disease outbreak in the UK [5].
Overall, our results suggest that a combination of evolutionary
processes, such as multiple mutations at highly variable sites,
positive selection, and/or reassortment, drove the genetic diversity
observed in the HPAI H7N7. The effect of these processes might
have been stronger at the early stages of the epidemic, as farms
may have been infected for longer time before control measures
were taken (as reported for F191). The long branches and poor
quality of connections at the base of the network supports this
hypothesis. Despite this complex evolutionary history of the H7N7
virus, most farm samples could be grouped within clearly defined
and chronologically sound clusters of infection, giving us valuable
insights on the spreading of the virus during the epidemic.
Inter-farm transmission dynamics of HPAI H7N7
Boender et al. [9] have previously performed a spatial analysis of
inter-farm transmission using epidemiological data from the HPAI
H7N7 epidemic. They showed that risk of transmission decreased
with inter-farm distance and they could map higher-risk areas for
the spread of the virus. However, the epidemiological data did not
permit the resolution of the pathways of transmission between
farms. Our results show that the analysis of viral genetic data can
complement epidemiological studies, allowing notably the identi-
fication of clusters of infections and of specific farm-to-farm
transmission events. The geographical position of the farms
associated with the transmission clusters identified from the
phylogenetic analyses is indicated in Figure 1. Most of the farms
of Cluster I are located geographically close to one another,
suggesting that inter-farm virus transmission during the epidemic
was at least partially caused by short distance air-borne
movements of virus particles [30]. However, farms of cluster III
showed a combination of aggregated and dispersed geographical
location, whereas Cluster II and Cluster III were more dispersed
Figure 5. Schematic diagrams summarizing within-flock genetic diversity in 6 farm samples. The sequence variants found by clonal
sequencing of partial NA and HA genes in 6 different samples are represented by coloured circles sized relatively to their frequency. Total number of
clones sequenced per sample (n) is indicated. The exact number of copies of each genetic variant is indicated when .1. Variants in black correspond
to the sequence originally isolated in each farm. Each variant is separated by nucleotide substitutions represented by filled black dots (non-
synonymous changes) or open dots (synonymous changes), and by deletions represented by squares. The exact position of the deletion in the NA
gene is indicated. The red node represents a variant similar to the sequence obtained for the F192 sample (see main text). The white node represents
a potential missing variant.
doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1002094.g005
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within the Gelderland area. It is possible that such transmission
between farms separated by 5–15 km occurred naturally, as avian
influenza viruses could persist for long periods in the environment
(e.g. water or feather) [31,32]. The poultry production system with
its professional contacts could also have favoured virus spread
during the epidemic. Notably, some operations of farms, such as
egg collection, were resumed during the epidemic and may have
played a role in virus transmission [33]. We estimated that the
H7N7 virus was present in poultry maybe weeks before the first
outbreak, so it is possible that the virus spread via a network of
contacts formed by normal poultry operations across the Gelder-
land area before the implementation of the transport ban. Also, it
has been recently shown that many humans involved in the
control of the epidemic were infected by H7N7 in farms they
visited [34]. Thus, H7N7 virus might have been transmitted
between farms by infected people or by human-mediated
mechanical transport. Analyzing the sequence of virus isolated
from infected humans and the movements of people involved in
control activities could help to determine whether human-
mediated transport played a role in the inter-farm transmissions.
Importantly, our results also suggest that a discrete number of
long distance transmission events were at the origin of the virus
spread into new areas, rather than a slow wave-like movement of
the virus towards the south of the country. Notably, it is interesting
to note that farm UN167, a back-yard poultry farm, seems to be at
the origin of the outbreak in the Limburg area. Conversely, Bavink
et al. [35] showed with epidemiological models that back-yard
poultry probably played a marginal role during the outbreak,
suggesting that pre-emptive culling of this type of farm may not
always be necessary. Our results suggest that these types of poultry
farms should still be considered important in control strategies.
This result and all other farm-to-farm transmission events
identified should be considered with caution because 27% of the
farms infected during the epidemic could not be sequenced.
However, only few missing farms could still be at the origin of the
infection in Limburg and all are located in Gelderland .50 km
away from the index farm of Limburg (Figure 1). It strongly
suggests that a long distance transmission event is at the origin of
the second important H7N7 outbreak in the Netherlands. Such
long distance movements of avian influenza are most likely the
results of human-mediated transport of the virus, although
airborne spread cannot be totally ruled out. Possible causes of
human-mediated virus movements are lack of knowledge or poor
compliance of the biosafety measures implemented, such as
unauthorized movements of birds or their products. Better
enforcement and more widely distributed biosafety instructions
and training could substantially decrease the risk of introduction of
the virus to new areas. Future studies combining genetic data with
available epidemiological data should provide a better resolution
of the inter-farm transmission network that shaped the epidemic,
and further understanding on the mechanisms involved in H7N7
spread during the epidemic. This study shows that partial viral
genomic data (here 3 genes out of the 8 composing the AI genome)
can provide important insights on the transmission dynamics of
HPAI viruses even at the scale of temporally and spatially limited
epidemic. Our study also strongly suggests that comprehensive
study of the evolutionary processes involved in shaping virus
diversity are needed in order to use viral genetic data in such ways.
Materials and Methods
Viral sequence data
Samples were collected as part of the diagnosis by veterinarians
of the Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (the
Netherlands) and submitted to the Central Veterinary Institute
for confirmation by virus isolation. The authors of this study were
not involved in sample collection. Viral RNA was directly
extracted from 184 infected trachea tissue samples from dead
chickens (5 chickens per sample) using a High Pure Viral RNA
extraction kit (Roche Diagnostics Indianapolis IN, USA). Com-
plementary DNA was synthesized by reverse transcription reaction
using SuperScript III (Invitrogen, Carlsbad CA, USA), and gene
amplification by PCR was performed using the PCR Expand high
fidelity kit (Roche Diagnostics Indianapolis IN, USA) and primers
specific for the hemagglutinin (HA), neuraminidase (NA) and basic
polymerase 2 (PB2) gene segments. Sequencing was performed by
using the BigDye Terminator v. 1.1. sequencing kit (Applied
Biosystems, Foster City CA , USA) and an ABI Prism 3130 genetic
analyzer (Applied Biosystems). Primers and PCR protocols are
detailed in Table S4. Nucleotide sequences are available from the
GISAID database (EPI_ISL_68268-68352, and EPI_ISL_82373-
82472; Table S1).
Phylogenetic analyses
Sequences were aligned using BIOEDIT [36]. We used
likelihood ratio tests, Akaike and Bayesian information criteria as
implemented in DataMonkey [37] to select the simplest evolu-
tionary model that best fit the different dataset. For the three
genes, a Hasegawa–Kishino–Yano (HKY) model with gamma-
distributed rates among sites was selected. Rates of nucleotide
substitution and time of most recent common ancestors
(TMRCAs) were estimated for the three genes using a Bayesian
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (BMCMC) method [12] as
implemented in the program BEAST [13]. Isolation dates were
used to calibrate the molecular clock. Different combinations of
molecular clock (strict clock or uncorrelated relaxed clocks [15])
and demographic models were attempted independently and the
best-fit clock and demographic models were selected by perform-
ing Bayes factor tests [14]. The limited timespan of our samples
required the use of a simple model to avoid over-parameterization
[38], so we used a single HKY model over all sites in preference to
a codon-partitioned model for these analyses. For each dataset,
three independent runs were conducted for 60 million generations,
sampling every 2,000 generations. Convergences and effective
sample sizes of the estimates were checked using TRACER [39].
Trees were summarized in a maximum clade credibility (MCC)
tree after a 20% burn-in using TREEANNOTATOR [13]. The
resulting time-scaled phylogenetic trees were visualised with
FIGTREE [40].
Additional methods were used to infer the phylogenetic
relationships from the HA, NA and PB2 datasets. A Bayesian
MCMC inference method was performed in MRBAYES [41],
with multiple runs of 10 million generations with a 20% burn-in,
sampling every 100 generations, and using the default heating
parameters. A Maximum Likelihood (ML) method implemented
in PHYML [42] was also used with a bootstrap analysis of 1,000
full bootstrap replicates to test the robustness of tree topologies.
The three gene segment alignments were manually concatenated
to generate a single alignment that was used to construct a
phylogenetic network using the Median Joining method [16]
implemented in the program NETWORK [17]. This model-free
method uses a parsimony approach, based on pairwise differences,
to connect each sequence to its closest neighbour, and allows the
creation of internal nodes (‘‘median vectors’’), which could be
interpreted as unsampled or extinct ancestral genotypes to link the
existing genotypes in the most parsimonious way. The parameter
epsilon, which controls the level of homoplasy, was set at the same
value as the weight of characters used to calculate the genetic
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distances (weight value = 10). The average number of nucleotide
differences within and between the phylogenetic clusters identified
was calculated with MEGA [43].
Recombination and reassortment detection
Homologous recombination within each gene segment was
searched using Recombination Detection Program version 2
(RDP2) [11]. Putative reassortant viruses were preliminarily
identified by the topological incongruity between transmission
clusters identified across the phylogenies of different gene segments
(see results). This was further investigated with a subset of virus
sequences including samples from transmission cluster I (n = 9),
cluster II (n = 19), cluster III (n = 8), and cluster IV (n= 10), from
Limburg area (n = 10), and four additional samples with
incongruent phylogenies (F45, F76, F143, F210). For each sample,
the sequences from the 3 genes were manually concatenated, and
the resulting alignment was analyzed using bootscan analyses [22]
implemented in SIMPLOT [44].
Detection of selection pressure
Selection pressure on the HA, NA and PB2 genes was
investigated by estimating the ratio of non-synonymous to
synonymous nucleotide substitutions (v= dN/dS) using codon-
based phylogenetic methods implemented in CODEML (available
in the PAML package [18]). Likelihood ratio tests (LRTs) were
used to test whether model M1a of neutral evolution (sites
restricted to 0,v,1) or model M2a of positive selection (allows
sites with v .1) was a statistically better fit to the data [45]. If the
null model M1a was rejected in preference of M2a, a Bayes
Empirical Bayes method was used to identify individual codons
under positive selection [19]. In addition, positively selected sites
were detected using the single-likelihood ancestor counting
(SLAC), the random effect likelihood (REL), and the fixed effect
likelihood (FEL) methods [20] via the Datamonkey website [37].
Within flock viral genetic diversity
PCR amplification targeting a 850 bp portion of the NA gene
(bases 57–908) was performed on cDNA obtained from five
samples (F26, F36, F167, F191 and F193) using the PCR Expand
high fidelity kit (Roche Diagnostics). An additional PCR was used
to amplify a 570 bp portion of the HA gene (bases 81–650) on the
two samples from Limburg only (F191, F193). Primers and PCR
protocols are described in Table S4. PCR products were purified
using the High Pure PCR Products Purification kit (Roche
Diagnostics), and were cloned using the pGEM-T Easy Vector
System (Promega, Madison WI, USA). Clones with inserts of the
correct size were identified by agarose gel electrophoresis. A total
of 50–56 clones with NA inserts were sequenced per farm sample
using the BigDye Terminator sequencing kit, version 1.1. and an
ABI Prism 3130 genetic analyzer (Applied Biosystems). Nucleotide
sequences are available from the GISAID database
(EPI_ISL_82561-82902). Sequences were aligned to the original
HA or NA sequence obtained for each farm samples using
BIOEDIT [36], and nucleotide differences were recorded
manually.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Time-scaled phylogenies (dates on the horizontal axis)
inferred using Bayesian MCMC analysis from (A) HA gene; (B)
NA gene; (C) PB2 gene. Nodes supported by .0.7 posterior
probability are indicated by a grey dot. Posterior probability values
from the time-scaled BMCMC method, the MrBayes BMCMC
method, the Maximum Likelihood method (1,000 ML bootstrap
replications) are also indicated (tsBMCMC/MrBMCMC/ML).
Samples sharing identical HA, NA, and/or PB2 (named as
‘‘Group1-11’’ in the trees, when.3 isolates) are listed in Table S3.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Time-scaled median-joining phylogenetic network of
H7N7 viruses. This network is identical to figure 3, but with each
farm sample positioned along a time axis starting a day zero of the
epidemic. See legend of Figure 3 for more details.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Bootscan recombination analysis on the full dataset of
concatenated H7N7 virus sequences. Sequences obtained from (A)
F45, (B) F76, and (C) F143 were used as query in the analysis, with
a 800 bp window size and step size of 10 bp. A schematic diagram
of the concatenated HA, NA and PB2 virus segments is shown on
top.
(TIF)
Table S1 Description of the H7N7 virus samples used in this
study.
(DOC)
Table S2 Summary statistics of the BMCMC analyses.
(DOC)
Table S3 List of farm isolates sharing identical HA, NA and/or
PB2 sequences. Group names refer to names given in phylogenetic
trees in Figure S2A–C.
(DOC)
Table S4 List of primers and protocols used for PCR
amplification and sequencing of HA, NA and PB2 genes.
(DOC)
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